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Abstract
Cooperative games model the allocation of
profit from joint actions, following considera-
tions such as stability and fairness. We pro-
pose the reliability extension of such games,
where agents may fail to participate in the
game. In the reliability extension, each agent
only “survives” with a certain probability,
and a coalition’s value is the probability that
its surviving members would be a winning
coalition in the base game. We study promi-
nent solution concepts in such games, show-
ing how to approximate the Shapley value
and how to compute the core in games with
few agent types. We also show that apply-
ing the reliability extension may stabilize the
game, making the core non-empty even when
the base game has an empty core.
1 Introduction
Consider a communication network connecting a
source and target vertices, where each link is controlled
by a self-interested agent. Any link may fail, and if
such failures result in the elimination of all paths be-
tween the source and target, information cannot be
sent between them. Consider a planner aiming to
maximize the probability of allowing communication
between the source and target. Each link has its own
probability of failure, and together with the network
structure they determine the probability of connectiv-
ity between the source and target. When the planner
is only allowed to use a certain subset of the links,
we may consider links outside this set as failed links.
Given a reward for achieving such connectivity, what
is a reasonable way of allocating this reward between
the agents? Which links are the most critical?
This domain can be modeled as a cooperative game,
which we call the network reliability game. In this
game we are uncertain which links would survive, but
link failures are independent. The value of a link sub-
set, called a coalition, is the probability of achieving
connectivity using only these links. Game theoretic so-
lutions find ways of allocating the reward between the
agents, under considerations of fairness and stability.
The most prominent solution aiming at fairness is the
Shapley value [19], which is a measure of the criticality
of each edge to achieving connectivity. The core [13]
is the most common solution considering stability, and
contains all allocations where no subset of agents is in-
centivized to defect and form an alternative network.
Applying these solutions requires finding tractable al-
gorithms for computing them . Unfortunately, even
in domains where determining the value of a subset
of agents is easy, computing these solutions may be
hard. Further, the problem of computing the value of
a coalition in the network reliability game is the fa-
mous network reliability problem, which is known to
be computationally hard [16], making it even harder
to apply the required solutions.
Our contribution We propose the reliability exten-
sion of cooperative games, providing a general frame-
work for studying the effects of uncertain failures. We
focus on techniques for solving such games. We show
how to approximate the Shapley value in such games
using sampling, and how to accurately compute the
core in games with few agent types. We also show
that in simple games (such as our network game), re-
ducing the reliability of agents can only expand the
core, surprisingly making the game more stable. Sec-
tion 2 provides some definitions, Section 3 considers
the Shapley value in network settings, Section 4 ex-
tends the results for general domains and Section 5
examines the core. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
A transferable utility cooperative game is composed
of a set of n agents, N , and a characteristic function
v : 2N → R mapping any subset (coalition) of the
agents to a real value indicating the total utility these
agents achieve together. By convention v(∅) = 0. A
game is monotone if for all coalitions C ′ ⊂ C we have
v(C ′) ≤ v(C). A game H = 〈N, v〉 is simple, if v
only gets values of 0 or 1 (v : 2N → {0, 1}). We say
coalition C ⊂ N wins if v(C) = 1, and say it loses if
v(C) = 0. An agent i is critical in a winning coalition
C if her removal from that coalition would make it a
losing coalition: v(C) = 1, v(C \ {i}) = 0. A game
is convex if for any A,B ⊆ N we have v(A ∪ B) ≥
v(A) + v(B)− v(A ∩B).
The characteristic function defines what gains a coali-
tion achieves. Cooperative game theory provides solu-
tion concepts that define how the participants might
agree to distribute the gains. An imputation p =
(p1, . . . , pn) is a division of the gains among the agents,
where pi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 pi = v(N). The value pi is the
payoff of agent i, and the payoff of a coalition C is
p(C) =
∑
i∈C pi.
The core A basic requirement for a good imputa-
tion is that for any agent i ∈ C, we have pi ≥ v({i}),
otherwise i is better off working alone rather than as
a part of C (which only offers her pi). Similarly, a
coalition B blocks imputation p if p(B) < v(B), since
B’s members can defect, derive the gains v(B), give
each member i ∈ B its previous share pi, and still
some utility remains, so each member can get more.
If a blocked imputation is chosen, the coalition is un-
stable. The core is the set of all imputations that are
not blocked by any coalition. That is, if p ∈ core(H),
then for any coalition C we have p(C) ≥ v(C). The
core is the prominent solution concept focusing on sta-
bility [13], but it may be empty or contain more than
one imputation.
The Shapley value The Shapley value focuses on
fairness rather than on stability, by evaluating the
contribution of each agent to the grand coalition N .
Further, it is the unique imputation that fulfills im-
portant fairness axioms [19]. The Shapley value relies
on the notion of a marginal contribution of an agent in
a permutation, the amount of additional utility gener-
ated when that agent joins the coalition of her prede-
cessors in the permutation. We denote by pi ∈ Sn
a permutation of the agents, so pi : {1, . . . , n} →
{1, . . . , n} and pi is onto. Denote by Γpii the prede-
cessors of i in pi, so Γpii = {j|pi(j) < pi(i)}. Agent i’s
marginal contribution in the permutation pi is mpii =
v(Γpii ∪ {i}) − v(Γpii ). Note that in a simple game an
agent has a marginal contribution of 1 in the permuta-
tion pi iff it is critical for the coalition Γpii . The Shapley
value of an agent is her marginal contribution averaged
across all possible agent permutations.
Definition 1. The Shapley value is the imputation
(φ1(v), . . . , φn(v)) where
φi(v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
mpii =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
(v (Γpii ∪ {i})− v (Γpii ))
One interpretation of “power” is an agent’s a priori
probability of being critical in determining the out-
come of the game. Thus the Shapley value measures
an agent’s power to affect the outcome of the game.
3 Network Reliability Games
Consider the network reliability domain discussed in
Section 1. Suppose the the planner obtains a reward
of $1 for achieving s − t-connectivity. We can define
the value of a set C of edges as the planner’s expected
reward when she is only allowed to use the edges in C.
Since the reward is $1, the value of C is the probabil-
ity of the planner to achieve connectivity when only
allowed to use the edges of C.
Consider a directed graph G = 〈V,E〉 with a source
s ∈ V and target t ∈ V , where each edge ei is con-
trolled by an agent ai and has a failure probability of
1− ri ∈ [0, 1]. Thus an edge ei survives with probabil-
ity ri. Given a subset S ⊆ E of the edges, we use δS
as the characteristic denoting whether S is successful,
i.e. whether it allows connectivity between s and t:
δS =
{
1 if GS = 〈V, S〉 has a path from s to t
0 otherwise
The graph’s structure determines δS , which can be
viewed as a function mapping any coalition S to {0, 1},
denoting whether S is successful or not. We can de-
fine a game with a characteristic function vbase where
agents are the edges, and the value of coalition S
is vbase(S) = 1 if S has a path from s to t and
vbase(S) = 0 otherwise, so vbase(S) = δS . However,
such a definition does not take into account different
edge failure probabilities. This will be handled by the
relaiablity extension defined next, which we generalize
to other set-systems in Section 4.
Suppose the planner can only use the edges C ⊆ E.
It cannot use edges in E \ C, and even the edges in
C may not survive. Each edge i ∈ C survives with
probability ri, so from the original edges E we get a
set C ′ ⊆ C of surviving edges. Denote the probability
that the edges surviving from C are exactly those in C ′
as Pr(C ′|C) =∏i∈C′ ri ·∏j∈C\C′(1−rj). The success
of the surviving edges is a random variable, and the
probability of the surviving edges to be successful is:
∑
C′⊆C
Pr(C ′|C) · δC′ =
∑
C′⊆C
∏
i∈C′
ri
∏
j∈C\C′
(1− rj)
· δC′ .
Thus, the above expression is the probability that the
planner would achieve its goal of sending a message
from s to t when it is only allowed to use the edges
C ⊆ E.1 Any subset C ⊆ E the planner is allowed
to use results in a different probability of connectivity
between s and t. We define a game where the edges are
the agents, and the characteristic function v : 2E → R
maps any subset of edges C to the probability that
the planner would achieve connectivity between s and
t when only the edges C are at its disposal.
Definition 2 (The Network Reliability Game).
Given a graph G = 〈V,E〉 and survival probabilities ri
for each ei ∈ E, the network reliability game is a game
over the agents E with the characteristic function:
v(C) =
∑
C′⊆C
∏
i∈C′
ri ·
∏
j∈C\C′
(1− rj)
 · δC′ .
As an example consider a network with one edge e con-
necting the source to the target directly, and a paral-
lel path C of 3 edges connected serially and forming a
path between the source and target. Assume each link
has a survival probability of 12 . Consider the coalition
C of the serial edges only. To achieve connectivity
all three must survive, an event whose probability is
1
23 =
1
8 . The value of this coalition C is thus v(C) =
1
8 .
Adding the direct link e to C increases this probability
to v(C ∪ {e}) = 1− ( 78 · 12 ).
The edges in the network may be unequal in their
criticality in achieving connectivity between s and t.
Some edges have little influence on the probability of
achieving the goal because of their location in the net-
work. Others have little influence because their sur-
vival probability is low, so including them is unlikely to
change the outcome. How should we quantify all these
effects to find reliability problems in the network?
A key component in such an analysis is the marginal
contribution of an edge in various contexts. One def-
inition of a “context” is a permutation of the agents
(edges). Using this definition we can use the Shapley
value to rank edges by their impact on the probability
of attaining the goal. Previous work already suggests
game theoretic solutions (including the Shapley value)
for analyzing network reliability problems [12, 5, 1, 4].
1When the planner obtains one unit of reward for
achieving connectivity between s and t, this expression is
also the expected reward it obtains.
However, these approaches do not model different link
failure probabilities. Unfortunately, computing solu-
tions such as the Shapley value are computationally
hard in many domains. One way to overcome this dif-
ficulty is using approximation algorithms, such as sam-
pling various contexts and computing an agent’s con-
tribution in each. The average contribution an agent
has in the sampled contexts is used to estimate its av-
erage marginal contribution across all contexts. Com-
puting mpii = v(Γ
pi
i ∪ {i})− v(Γpii ), the contribution in
context pi, requires computing the values of two coali-
tions. In the case of the network reliability game, this
is the famous network reliability problem, known to
be #P-hard [16]. Thus, a na¨ıve sampling approach is
intractable for this problem.
Although solving network reliability exactly is hard,
this problem is approximable through sampling. We
show how to compute the Shapley value for the net-
work reliability game using a sampling approach. The
value of a coalition C ⊆ N is given by:
v(C) =
∑
S⊆C
δSPr(S|C) =
∑
S⊆C
δS
∏
i∈S
ri
∏
j∈C\S
(1− rj)
The contribution of x ∈ N in permutation pi is:
mpii = v(Γ
pi
i ∪ {i})− v(Γpii )
=
∑
S⊆Γpii ∪{i}
δSPr(S|Γpii ∪ {i})−
∑
S⊆Γpii
δSPr(S|Γpii )
We examine qi =
∑
S⊆Γpii ∪{i} δSPr(S|Γ
pi
i ∪ {i}):
qi =
∑
S⊆Γpii ∪{i}
δSPr(S|Γpii ∪ {i})
=
∑
S⊆Γpii ∪{i}|i∈S
δSPr(S|Γpii ∪ {i}) +
∑
S⊆Γpii ∪{i}|i/∈S
δSPr(S|Γpii ∪ {i})
=
∑
S⊆Γpii
δS∪{i} · ri · Pr(S|Γpii )
+
∑
S⊆Γpii
δS · (1− rr) · Pr(S|Γpii )
We now express mpii in terms of v(Γ
pi
i ):
mpii =ri
∑
S⊆Γpii
δS∪{i}Pr(S|Γpii ) + (1− ri)v(Γpii )− v(Γpii )
=ri
∑
S⊆Γpii
δS∪{i}Pr(S|Γpii )− ri
∑
S⊆Γpii
δSPr(S|Γpii )
=ri
∑
S⊆Γpii
(δS∪{i} − δS)Pr(S|Γpii )
The Shapley value of agent i in the game H with char-
acteristic function v can be written as
φi(v) =
1
|N |!
∑
pi∈Sn
mpii (Def. 1)
=
ri
|N |!
∑
pi∈Sn
∑
S⊆Γpii
(δS∪{i} − δS)Pr(S|Γpii )
=
ri
|N |!
∑
pi∈Sn
 ∑
S⊆Γpii
(δS∪{i} − δS)
∏
j∈S
rj
∏
j′∈Γpii \S
(1− rj′)

Consider selecting a permutation of N uniformly at
random and constructing a random variable by sam-
pling the survival of each of the agents in Γpii :
Algorithm 1. ShapleyApproxBase(v) :
1. Select pi ∈ Sn uniformly at random from all per-
mutations over N .
2. Set Γpii to be the predecessors of i in pi.
3. Set li = 1 with probability ri and li = 0 with prob-
ability 1− ri.
4. If li = 0 return Zi = 0.
5. For each j ∈ Γpii set lj = 1 with probability rj and
set lj = 0 with probability 1− rj.
6. Denote S = {j ∈ Γpii |lj = 1} (survivor set)
7. If δS∪{i} − δS = 1 then set Zi = 1 otherwise set
Zi = 0.
8. Return Zi
Lemma 1. Let Zi be the random variable generated
by the above algorithm. Then the expected value of Zi
is the Shapley value of x so: E(Zi) = φi(v).
Proof. We choose pi uniformly at random from the set
Sn of all edge permutations, so by linearity of expec-
tation:
E(Zi) =∑
pi∈Sn
 ri
|N |!
∑
S⊆Γpii
∏
j∈S
rj
∏
j′∈Γpii \S
(1− rj′) · (δS∪{i} − δS)

= φi(v),
as required.
We can repeat the above algorithm k times, to ob-
tain multiple random samples chosen i.i.d from the
same distribution. We can then take an average over
all samples as a better approximation for the Shapley
value φi(v).
Algorithm 2. ShapleyApprox(v, k) :
1. Z ′ = 0
2. Repeat k times:
(a) Zi = ShapleyApproxBase(v)
(b) Z ′ = Z ′ + Zi
3. return Z = 1k · Z ′
The quality of the estimate Z returned by Algorithm 2
depends on k, the number of samples used. We use
Hoeffding’s inequality to evaluate the approximation
quality of Z for φi(v). Our goal is to obtain the re-
quired number of times k we must sample such that
with a high probability 1− δ we obtain an approxima-
tion Z to φi(v) that is within an  distance from the
true value, so |Z − φi(v)| ≤ .
Theorem 1 (Hoeffding’s inequality [14]). Let
X1, . . . , Xk be independent random variables, where
all vairables are bounded s.t. Xt ∈ [a, b], and let
X =
∑k
t=1Xt. Then the following inequality holds.
Pr(|X − E[X]| ≥ k) ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2 k
2 2
(b− a)2k
)
We note that all Zt are numbers between 0 and 1 and
that E[kZ] = E[Z ′] = k · φi(v). Thus:
Pr(|Z−φi(v)| ≥ ) = Pr(|kZ−kφi(v)| ≥ k) ≤ 2e−2 k 2
We next compute the required samples k to bound this
probability below δ.
Theorem 2 (Power Confidence Interval). Given
a required accuracy  > 0 and confidence 1 − δ the
interval [Z − , Z + ], where Z is the result of Al-
gorithm 2, contains φi(v) with probability 1 − δ pro-
vided that the number of samples is at least: k ≥ ln 2δ2 2 .
Similarly, given a number of samples k and a required
confidence of 1 − δ, a confidence interval that con-
tains the correct value φi(v) with probability 1 − δ is[
Z −
√
1
2k ln
2
δ , Z +
√
1
2k ln
2
δ
]
Proof. We apply Hoeffding’s inequality to make bound
the error probability at δ and obtain:
Pr(|Z − φi(v)| ≥ ) ≤ 2 e−2 k 2 ≤ δ
Extracting the required  and k we get: −2 k 2 ≤ ln δ2 ,
or alternatively: 2 ≥ − ln δ22 k . Thus the relation be-
tween the number of samples k, the required confi-
dence δ and the accuracy  is:
 ≥
√
1
2k
ln
2
δ
k ≥ ln
2
δ
2 2
,
as required.
4 General Reliability Games
Section 3 has focused on a network domain with a spe-
cific goal connectivity goal when edges are susceptible
to failures. However, a similar approach can be taken
for other network goals, such as achieving a minimal
bandwidth or minimizing latency. Similar situations
also arise not only in network environments. Gener-
ally, consider any domain where a set of agents can
cooperate on a task, where some subsets of the agents
are successful and can achieve the task, while others
cannot do so. Such a domain can be described as a
simple game H over the set N of agents, with a char-
acteristic function v : 2N → {0, 1}. We call this game
v the base game. Now consider the case where each
agent i ∈ N only survives with probability ri and is
eliminated with probability 1 − ri. In other words,
given that the coalition C is formed, each agent i ∈ C
only survives with probability ri, so the coalition is
transformed into the coalition C ′ ⊆ C of surviving
agents. The value achieved by the surviving coalition
C ′ is a random variable. The reliability extension of
the base game is a new game, where a coalition C’s
value is the probability that after eliminating agents
according to the individual survival probabilities, the
surviving agents C ′ would win the game.2
Definition 3 (The Reliability Extension). Given
a simple cooperative game H with characteristic func-
tion v : 2N → {0, 1} over the n agents N and
the survival probability vector r = (r1, . . . , rn) (where
0 ≤ ri ≤ 1), we define the reliability game Hr over the
same agent set N with the characteristic function vr
as follows.
vr(C) =
∑
C′⊆C
αr(C ′|C) · v(C ′), (1)
where αr(C ′|C) =∏i∈C′ ri ·∏j∈C\C′(1− rj).
Note that αr(C ′|C) is Pr(C ′|C) according to the sur-
vival probability vector r.
The network reliability game is the reliability exten-
sion of the base game v where agents are the edges a
coalition of edges wins if it contains an s− t-path. We
denoted the value of coalition C ⊆ E in the base game
as δC , so δ is the characteristic function of the base
game. We show that our Shapley approximation algo-
rithm can be used for any reliability extension game.
Corollary 1. Let H be a simple cooperative game,
with characteristic function v : 2N → {0, 1}, and let
Hr = 〈N, vr〉 be its reliability extension using the prob-
ability vector r. Given an algorithm for computing the
2We focus on simple base games. It is easy to extend
the results to general (non-boolean) games, by setting a
coalition’s value in the reliability extension to its expected
revenue after retaining only the surviving agents.
base characteristic function v(C) (for any C ⊆ N), it
is possible to approximate the Shapley φi(vr) of agent
i ∈ N in the reliability extension in polynomial time
(in the confidence δ and accuracy ).
Proof. The analysis in Section 3 used δS to denote the
value of a coalition S in the base game, and only as-
sumed that given S one can compute δS in polynomial
time. In the network reliability game this required
testing for an s − t-path in the induced graph. In a
general reliability game v, δC is the value of the coali-
tion C in the base game, so δC = v(C). Thus, given a
polynomial algorithm to compute v(C) we can evalu-
ate δC for any coalition C in polynomial time. Due to
Theorem 2, to achieve a confidence δ and accuracy 
we must run algorithm 2 with a number of samples k
that is polynomial in  and δ. Each sample results in
a call to Algorithm 1, which has a polynomial running
time when evaluating δC can be done in polynomial
time. Thus, the total running time of Algorithm 1
with the required k is also polynomial.
5 The Core of Reliability Games
A natural question is how stability (in terms of strate-
gic behavior) is affected as reliability decreases. While
generally various effect are possible, we give a conclu-
sive answer regarding convex and simple games. We
show that if a simple or convex base game is stable (i.e.
has a non-empty core), then any reliability extension
of it is still stable. Further, the core of an extended
simple game can be easily characterized.
Theorem 3. Let H = 〈N, v〉 be a convex game. For
any probability vector r the reliability extension Hr has
a non-empty core. Conversely, if H is not convex, then
there is at least one extension with an empty core.
Proof sketch. A game v is know to be convex if and
only if every subgame of v has a non-empty core [18].
For every C ∈ 2N \ ∅, let pC be a payoff vec-
tor in the core of v|C (the subgame of v that con-
tains only players from C). Recall αr from Defini-
tion 3. It is easy to verify that the payoff vector
pr =
∑
C∈2N\∅ α
r(C|N)pC is in the core of vr.3 First
note that pr is a valid payoff vector, i.e. that pr(N) =
vr(N). Indeed, pr(N) =
∑
C∈2N\∅ α
r(C|N)pC(N) =∑
C∈2N\∅ α
r(C|N)pC(C) =
∑
C∈2N\∅ α
r(C|N)v(C) =
vr(N), where the last equality is just the definition
of vr (see Eq. (1)). It is also easy to show that no
coalition S can block pr. The second direction follows
trivially, as any subgame v|C is a reliability extension
of v where ri = 1 iff i ∈ C and 0 otherwise.
3Note that pC only set the payoff of agents in C. We
therefore pad it with zeros, i.e. pC(i) = 0 for all i /∈ C.
5.1 Simple games
Even if the base game is simple, the reliability exten-
sion is typically not a simple game. Indeed, unless all
the components of the probability vector r are either
0 or 1, in the reliability extension some coalitions are
going to have a fractional value. We first discuss veto
agents. In a simple game i is a veto agent if it is crit-
iccal in every coalition, i.e. if i /∈ C then v(C) = 0. In
a non-simple game i is a veto agent if no coalition has
a strictly positive value without the agent.
Lemma 2 (The Reliability Extension Preserves
Veto Agents). Let v be a simple monotone game
used as a base game. If i ∈ N is a veto agent
in the base game v, then for any probability vector
r = (r1, . . . , rn), it holds that i is a veto agent in vr.
Proof. Let i be a veto agent in v. Assume by contra-
diction that it is not a veto agent in vr, so for some
coalition C that i /∈ C we have vr(C) > 0. How-
ever, by definition of the reliability extension vr(C) =∑
C′⊆C α
r(C ′|C) · v(C ′), so at least one component in
the sum must be strictly positive. Denote this compo-
nent as αr(C∗|C)·v(C∗). Thus we have v(C∗) > 0. By
monotonicity, since C∗ ⊆ C then 0 < v(C∗) ≤ v(C) in
contradiction to i being a veto agent.
A known folklore theorem relates the core and veto
agents in simple games. It states that in a simple game
the core is empty if and only if the game has no veto
agents. Further, in a simple game with veto agents,
any imputation that allocates 0 to the non-veto agents
and allocates v(N) in total to the veto agents (in any
way) is in the core.
Corollary 2. Let v be a simple monotone game to be
used as a base game. If v has a non-empty core then
for any probability vector r the reliability extension vr
of v has a non-empty core.
Proof. First note that a simple game with a non-empty
core is always convex. This is simply since the game
must have a veto agent, and therefore every two win-
ning coalitions intersect. Thus v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥
v(S)+ v(T ) (there is actually an equality). Therefore,
by Theorem 3, the core of vr is non-empty.
By Theorem 3 and Lemma 2, we can also find impu-
tations in the core, when the core of the base game is
non-empty. One simply allocates all the value of the
game to the veto agents of the base game, in an arbi-
traty way. Since all veto agents must be contained in
every subgame v|C with value greater than zero, this
results in a stable imputation pr.
The folklore theorem also shows the converse regarding
veto agents and the core: if a simple game has no
veto agents then the core is empty. In the reliability
extension of a game the core may be non-empty even
when the base game has no veto agents.
Figure 1: A network reliability game with an empty-
core in the base game. There are 5 agents N =
{a, b, c, d, e}. Survival probabilities are ra = rd = re =
0.5 and rb = rc = 0.1.
Observation 1. There exist a simple game v with
no veto agents (and thus with an empty core) such
that its reliability extension for some probability vector
(r1, . . . , rn) has a non-empty core.
Proof. Consider the network reliability game with five
edges in Figure 1. It is easy to see that for a coalition
to win in the base game it must contain at least one of
the following edge subsets {a, b}, {c, d}, {a, e, d}. The
base game has no veto agent - edges a, b and e are not
veto agents as the coalition {c, d} wins without them,
and edges c, d are not veto agents as the coalition
{a, b} wins without them. Thus the base connectivity
game has an empty core.
It is easy to verify that the resulting reliability exten-
sion game for this probability vector has the following
values: v({a, b} = v({c, d}) = 0.05, v({a, d, e} = 0.125,
v({a, b, c, d}) = 0.0975, v({a, b, c, d, e}) = 0.19875. For
all the other edge subsets, their value is either 0, or the
maximal value over the previous subsets that they con-
tain. Consider the following imputation ra = rc = 0,
rb = rd = 0.05 and re = v(N) − rb − rd = 0.09875.
It is easy to verify that for every edge subset C we
have p(C) =
∑
i∈C ri ≥ v(C) (to see that this holds,
one needs only consider the previously discussed coali-
tions and verify the core constraint holds for them).
Since this is a core imputation, the core is not empty
and we have a simple game with an empty core whose
reliability extension has a non-empty core.
Consider the same game where e is eliminated from the
base game. The base game still has an empty core.
The extension of this game (with the same survival
probabilities for {a, b, c, d}) also has an empty core.
Observation 1 shows that although applying the relia-
bility extension (for any probability vector) to a simple
game can never eliminate the core if it exists, applying
it may or may not make the core non-empty when the
original game had an empty core. We have not been
able to construct a polynomial algorithm for testing
whether the core is empty for general reliability games.
5.2 Cores of Reliability Games With Few
Agent Types and Survival Probabilities
We provide an algorithm for finding core imputations
in reliability games with few survival probabilities and
agent types. We first discuss typed-games. We say
that two agents i, j ∈ N are equivalent if for any
coalition C such that i, j /∈ C we have v(C ∪ {i}) =
v(C ∪ {j}). Typed-games consider equivalence classes
of agents. A typed game is a game with a set T of
agent types (t1, . . . , tk), where each agent i ∈ N has
a type t(i) ∈ T and the value v(C) of a coalition C
only depends on the types of the agents in C. Given a
coalition C we denote qj(C) = |{i ∈ C|t(i) = tj}| (i.e.
the number of agents of type tj in C), and #T (C) =
(q1(C), . . . , qk(C)). In a typed-game we require that if
for two coalitions A,B we have #T (A) = #T (B) then
v(A) = v(B). A coalition’s value only depends on the
quantities of agents of each type, so we can express the
characteristic function as v : (N ∪ {0})k → R, where
v(q1(C), q2(C), . . . , qk(C)) stands for the value v(C) of
any coalition C that contains qj agents of type tj .
Our algorithm operates on a reliability extension game
vr, where the base game v is a typed-game where the
number of different agents types is bounded by a con-
stant k. We further assume that the survival proba-
bility vector r has a constant number m of different
probabilities. Thus, each ri ∈ R = {r1, r2, . . . , rm}
(where R is a set of m different probability values).
We call such games limited reliability games.
Given an agent i in the reliability extension vr, we
denote its type in the base game as tbase(i). We fur-
ther note that if two agents i, j have the same type
in the base game (tbase(i) = tbase(j)), and both have
the same survival probability (ri = rj), then the two
agents are equivalent in the reliability extension (as
can be seen directly from the formula for vr(C) in Def-
inition 3). Both k,m are constants, so w.l.o.g. we as-
sume that agents of the same type also have the same
survival probability, and are therefore equivalent (this
only increases the number of types from k to mk).
Consider a coalition C such that #T (C) =
(q1, . . . , qk). We denote the probability that exactly
w of type ti would survive as Pi(w,C). we have
Pi(w,C) =
(
qi(C)
w
)
(ri)w(1− ri)(qi(C)−w). We can then
express the value of every coalition as follows:
vr(C) =
q1(C)∑
w1=0
. . .
qk(C)∑
wk=0
k∏
i=0
Pi(wi, C)v(w1, . . . , wk).
Since k is constant and qi(C) ≤ n, we can compute
v(C) using this formula in time O(nk), which is poly-
nomial in the number of agents.
We now turn to finding core imputations. The core
can be defined using a simple feasibility linear program
over the variables p1, . . . , pn that has a constraint for
any coalition C, stating the
∑
i∈C pi ≥ v(C). How-
ever, since the number of different coalitions is 2n,
this program has an exponential number of constrains,
so it is intractable to use it find core imputations.
To avoid this problem, use the following well-known
folklore theorem regarding cooperative games: if the
core is non-empty then there exists a core imputation
p = (p1, . . . , pn) where for any two agents i, j that are
equivalent we have pi = pj . In other words, if the core
is non-empty then it contains an imputation where all
agents of the same type have the same payoff.
In a limited reliability game we have a constant num-
ber k of agent types, so we can maintain a variable
for each extended type. Denote the payment for an
agent of base type ti by p(i) (where 1 ≤ i ≤ k). We
now construct a feasibility linear program over the
p(i) variables. We say that a coalition is of profile
q = (q1, . . . , qk) if #T (C) = q (i.e. if the coalition con-
tains the specified amounts of agents of each extended
type). There are k types and n agents, so the number
of different coalition profiles is at most nk, polynomial
in the number of agents (as k is constant). All payoffs
of agents of the same type are identical, thus for every
coalition C of profile q, p(C) =
∑k
i=1 qip(i). Finally,
we have the following core constraint for each coalition
profile q:
k∑
i=1
qip(i) ≥ v(q1, . . . , qk).
We therefore have a linear program over k variables,
p(1), . . . , p(k) with a polynomial number of constrains.
If we solve this program (e.g. using the ellipsoid
method), we obtain a core imputation. If there is no
solution, then the core is empty.
6 Conclusions and Related Work
We proposed the reliability extension of cooperative
games, and discussed algorithms for solving this exten-
sion. Solving cooperative games has been well-studied
and solutions have been offered for various represen-
tations [10, 6, 8] and even for games with uncertain
payoffs [21]. To our knowledge, this is the first pa-
per to consider computational issues in cooperative
games with uncertain rewards due to independent fail-
ures. Although computing the Shapley value is hard in
various domains, several approximation methods have
been suggested [10, 9, 11]. Our sampling approach for
approximating the Shapley value is similar to [3], but
does not assume a method for computing the charac-
teristic function of any coalition in polynomial time (as
mentioned, for the network reliability game, comput-
ing a coalition’s value is #P-hard). We also showed
how to compute the core when the base game has veto
agents and for limited reliability games, and noted im-
portant differences between the core of a simple game
and the core of its extension. We used game theoretic
solutions to find reasonable reward allocations. Other
applications of such solutions include analyzing pre-
diction markets [7] and measuring inconsistencies in
probabilistic knowledge bases [20].
Some questions remain open. On the conceptual level,
it is important to better characterize the conditions
on the base game and survival probability that guar-
anty the non-emptiness of the core. On the algorith-
mic level, natural questions from computational game
theory should be answered for this new rich family of
games. What algorithms can compute the core of un-
restricted reliability games? Can the Shapley value be
exactly computed in restricted forms of these games?
Can one tractably compute other solutions such as the
kernel or least-core (see [15]) and the Cost of Stabil-
ity [2, 17] in such games?
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